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Abstract. The long-term evolution of multi agent multi criteria decision making (MCDM) and to 
obtain sustainable decision a novel methodology is proposed based on evolutionary game theory. 
In this paper multi agent MCDM is represented as an evolutionary game and the evolutionary 
strategies are defined as sustainable decisions. Here we consider the problem of decision making 
in Indian Tea Industry. The agents in this game are essentially Indian Tea Estate owner and Indian 
Tea board. The replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game are studied to obtain evolutionary 
strategies which could be defined as sustainable strategies. The multi agent MCDM in Indian Tea 
Industry is considered under different socio-political and Corporate Social Responsibility scenario 
and groups of Indian Tea Industry. Again, the impacts of imprecision and market volatility on the 
outcome of some strategies (decisions) are studied. In this paper the imprecision on the impact of 
the strategies are modelled as fuzzy numbers whereas the market volatility is taken into account as 
white noise. Hence the MCDM problem for Indian Tea Industry is modelled as a hybrid evolution-
ary game. The probabilities of strategies are obtained by solving hybrid evolutionary game and could 
be represented as a Dempster-Shafer belief structure. The simulation results facilitate the Decision 
Makers to choose the strategies (decisions) under different type of uncertainty.
Keywords: MCDM in Indian Tea Industry, Evolutionary Game, Evolutionary stable strategies, 
Sustainable solution to MCDM, Uncertain Evolutionary game, Strategies under uncertainty, Sus-
tainable development with CSR. 
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D81, G34.
Introduction
Any multi agent MCDM problem involves simultaneous decision making which could be 
set-up as a game problem where the criteria and alternatives can be considered as strategies 
of the agents (players). MCDM is a method to select most convenient alternative among 
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available ones with respect to some evaluation criteria fixed by the decision makers (DM) 
of a particular social problems (Debnath et al. 2017). Most of the MCDM methods recom-
mend combining the aims of dissimilar DMs and altering the complex multi-objective deci-
sion making model into a single-objective model (Andreopoulou et al. 2017). In classical 
techniques of MCDM may not be sufficient to obtain an efficient (compromised or Pareto 
optimal) solution (in case of multi agent MCDM) or a satisfactory decision strategy in many 
industrial or engineering problems (Madani, Lund 2011). Consequently, when more than 
one agent interacts with their respective objectives, the classical MCDM problem could be 
extended to a strategic game theoretic model. Some of the relevant works can be found in 
the existing research work (Kang, Morin 2016; Aplak, Türkbey 2013; Deng et al. 2014; Mo-
hanty, Gupta 2015). Although MCDM models (Roy et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Debnath et al. 
2017) serves good compromised solutions, it is found that many classical MCDM approaches 
overlook the behaviours of DMs. Evolutionary game theory provides evolutionary strategies 
which are sustainable solutions for the MCDM. In classical game theory, the strength of the 
Nash equilibrium concept rests upon three imperative assumptions (1) rational behaviour 
of agents (2) complete sharing of empirical information, (3) all the agents have common 
knowledge of these assumptions. The strictness of these assumptions leaves the Nash equilib-
rium vulnerable to criticism because we can simply consider circumstances where any or all 
of these assumptions cannot realistically be applied (Grant, Quiggin 2017). On the contrast 
evolutionary game theory compare the outcomes of all types of behaviours to identify which 
one sustains in the long run. 
Concentrating on Indian Tea Estate (ITE), ninety percent of Tea production comes 
from – Assam, west Bengal, north and south India and the northeast region (Tirkey 2005). 
Almost all the researchers discussed multiple MCDM problems highlighting underutiliza-
tion of tea growing area, declining of global demand, rising of international tea competitor, 
promotion of small tea growers and bought leaf sectors, marketplace loyalties of Indian tea 
sectors, low sociability or Corporate Social Responsibility CSR with underpaid labour etc 
(Kotler, Lee 2005). The existing CSR studies (Cheruiyot, Tarus 2017; Kotler, Lee 2005) di-
agnose the suitable factors for firms as well as the regulations of governments, international 
organizations and NGOs to motivate sustainable CSR developments; on the basis of different 
MCDM techniques. However this article explores evolutionary dynamics which illustrate the 
impact of different policies performed in the long run and identifies the sustainable factors 
to get ideal economic benefit with sustainable CSR activities. Also this study has assessed the 
CSR performance under uncertainties and complexities. The complexities of Indian Tea sec-
tor management are arising from clashes of contrasting interest of stakeholders and conflicts 
at different agents. Conflicts can happen at a local ground when numbers of ITE follow dif-
ferent attitudes in sociability or CSR in a same region or nationally, when Tea Development 
Authorities/ Indian Tea Board (ITB) in two states show different attitudes to developing the 
tea industry (Lazonick, O’Sullivan 2000).
The articulation of business strategies (or criteria) involving CSR after maintaining In-
dian Tea Board’s (ITBs) multiple regulatory criteria (or strategies) and satisfying the market 
demand (national, international) is a huge challenge to tea industry. The current research 
work recommends a novel evolutionary game based approach for MCDM models and deals 
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decision making under uncertain environments. The long-term evaluation of the repeated 
performance of the game is considered using evolutionary dynamics. The novelty of this 
research work can be stated as follows: 
 – An evolutionary game model is to study MCDM problems under certain and uncer-
tain environments.
 – This is the first attempt to model the MCDM problem in Indian Tea Industry (ITI) as 
an evolutionary game between the Tea Estate Owner (TEO) and ITB.
 – The fuzzy evolutionary game and its dynamics are studied to obtain sustainable strat-
egies in various geophysical and regional political scenarios.
The study presents a case study of decision making in the Tea Industry in India, where the 
outline of presenting MCDM models as Evolutionary strategic games is depicted. After that, 
a stochastic game model by means of Monte-Carlo simulation is framed for decision making 
under uncertainties manifested about the pay-off values. Also, the fuzzy stochastic game model 
is developed to deal with imprecision of outcome of strategies as well as market volatility.
1. MCDM problem as a strategic game
Typically, a MCDM problem with m alternatives and n criteria can be defined in the follow-
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where ijπ  is the performance of i th alternative under the j th criterion for 1,2,...,i m=  and 
1,2,..., .j n=  Also, the relationship between an MCDM and a Game is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Relationship between an MCDM and a Game (Madani, Lund 2011)
The elementary aspects of an MCDM model are: (1) criteria (2) alternatives and (3) per-
formances of alternatives for each criterion. These elements correspond to the primary rudi-
ments of strategic game as (1) players (2) strategies and (3) payoffs of players from probable 
outcomes, where outcomes refer to all probable mixtures of players’ strategies.
2. Decision strategy selection under CSR perspective
A MCDM model can be constructed by considering: (1) four alternatives to develop the 
estate with different ranges of CSR performance by tea owners and (2) five criteria of ITB 
are taken for proposed model.
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2.1. Regulatory strategies setting for ITB 
ITI is the world’s fourth largest Tea exporter, is losing ground to China as its domestic mar-
ket grows (WTN 2016). In this study, Indian tea industries have been segregated into four 
groups ( 1 2 3, ,G G G and 4G ) on the basis of geo-political-sociability condition at local level. 
Thus four “unmoved” group of tea industries are constructed as to manage multi-managerial 
dimensions of tea industry.
 – Group 1 ( 1G ): GOOD geographical location (i.e. the ITE are in favourable weather 
condition that enhance the plant growth, no pollution effect etc.) and GOOD Region-
al political situation (i.e. All are parts of ethics, jointly follow the rules and regulation, 
collaborative preservation of safety, peace, and prosperity etc.) 
 – Group 2 ( 2G ): GOOD geographical location and BAD Regional political situation 
(i.e. immorality or biasness, tendency to break the rules and regulation, lack of pres-
ervation of safety, peace, and prosperity etc.)  
 – Group 3 ( 3G ): BAD geographical location (i.e. the ITE are in a volatile weather con-
dition that prevent the plant growth, pollution effects the greenery etc.) and GOOD 
Regional political situation
 – Group 4 ( 4G ): BAD geographical location and BAD Regional political situation
For instance, the ITE group under “BAD geographical location and GOOD Regional 
political situation” is always challenging (Bhattacharya, Sen 2001) due to conflicting interest 
on CSR progress and corruption level. 
Due to the conflict between ITE and ITB on CSR based development; ITB employs a di-
verse attitude for different ITE groups. Depending upon estate’s disturbances, overall gloomy 
scenario of inaction on bought leaf sectors, tea import and estate’s capacity to control corrup-
tion (GW 2009) – ITB may chalk out various “altered” scenarios for regulatory purpose as:
 – Scenario 1 ( 1S ): “Governance to current estate’s disturbances”: Disturbances can be 
solved by the changes of volume of sociability or CSR, and also the ITB may give 
higher weightage on certain criteria as long term policy.
 – Scenario 2 ( 2S ): “Governance to control Bought Leaf sector and tea import”: Devel-
opment with CSR is possible under restricted or semi-open market policy in which 
criteria are the instrument to control the tea management. 
 – Scenario 3 ( 3S ): “Governance to estate’s capacity progression under minimum corrup-
tion level”: Estate’s capacity can increase through changes on land usage pattern (e.g. 
attachment of highly demandable agricultural product plantation with tea) and tourism, 
while it can easily flourish under transparent management for sociability development. 
 – Scenario 4 ( 4S ): “Governance to estate’s capacity progression under maximum cor-
ruption level”: Lack of transparency and accountably (e.g. tea adulteration, misty 
earning vs. labour payment) will hamper any alternative system of development with 
criteria setting. 
2.2. Professional strategies of Indian Tea industries (ITI)
Considering various levels of performance of sociability considered as alternatives of the tea 
industries’ socio-economic development can be classified into four types. These alternatives are:
 – Development with Praiseworthy CSR ( 1W ): Top most sociability and CSR performer 
(For example, “Makaibari” a model of developed ITE) as follows the features of “Com-
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mendable housing and rationing”, “Creditable prosperity of education”, “Admirable 
maintenance of labour policy” etc.
 – Development with Pledge CSR ( 2W ): Grate initiator of CSR activity (e.g., “Glenburn” 
a developed ITE) as follows the characteristics of “Assurance of commendable housing 
and rationing”, “undertaking of creditable prosperity of education”, “Bond of Admira-
ble maintenance of labour policy” etc.
 – Development with Scattering CSR ( 3W ): Performer of scattered CSR activities (e.g., 
“Dunkun” ITE) as follows the faces of “Disperse from standard housing and ration-
ing”, “Dissipate of prosperity of education”, “Disintegration of labour policy” etc. to 
develop the ITE.
 – Development with Fatigue CSR ( 4W ): Unwillingness to perform the CSR activity but 
running (e.g. “Bagrakota” ITE) with the features of ‘Falling down of standard housing 
and rationing”, “Listlessness to give prosperous education”, “Lethargy to maintain the 
labour policy” etc.
Here the term “development” has considered as traditional in nature whereas the magni-
tude or outlook of CSR performances have been distinguished by the terms – Praiseworthy, 
Pledge, Scattered and Fatigue CSR. These are defined as the most important indicators of ITE 
development under different “unmoved” and “altered” scenarios (IT 2006).
2.3. Professional strategies of ITB 
Considering the CSR based alternatives for tea industry development the criteria under 
multiple disciplines like economics, sociology, and political science perspectives (Cheruiyot, 
Tarus 2017), the study has proposed five criteria for ITB i.e.
 – Safeguard of Satisfactory National and International Tea Demand ( 1R ): An effort to 
maximize the National and International Tea demand ITB need to ensure Tea quality 
care and control over tea import. 
 – Comprehensive Infrastructure of Tea Industry ( 2R ): Teacher-student ratio based 
schooling, quality medical treatment, electricity, and enriched housing facilities are 
examples of it. 
 – Inclusive Labour Policy ( 3R ): Sufficient rationing, Doctors Availability, proper PF-gra-
tuity statement, hygiene issues.
 – Wide-ranging assistance to ITE ( 4R ): For instance, subsidy for machinery import and 
loss of production as incentives for ITE.
 – Ample Morality development ( 5R ): Minimizing the corruption of tea adulteration, 
financial ambiguity of the estate for the betterment of labours.
Under this various responsibilities, dimensions and disciplines for CSR performance, the tea 
industries till have lacked a strong ITB’s institutional observation under various “unmoved” and 
“altered” scenarios to design precarious professional strategic decisions to converse this flagging 
situation and fulfil stakeholder’s aspirations with strong interest of both players.
MCDM problem in tea industries may be modelled as follows. Under dissimilar “unmoved” 
and “altered” scenarios (as section 2.1), the MCDM model may be streamlined to four decision 
alternatives (as discussed in section 2.2) and five DMs (Eq. (1)). The objective of the problem is 
to select the optimal alternative for tea industries decision making groups with respect to differ-
ent criteria (as in section 2.3). The ideal alternative would have the Substantive demand for tea, 
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good infrastructure and sociability, logical assistance to the estate and zero level corruption. In 
order to frame the problem pay-off values in terms of linguistic form from Likert scale in crisp 
and fuzzy number (Table 1) comprise an uncertainty level for pay-offs.
3. Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionarily game theory was defined and introduced by Maynard and Price (1973) and 
further developed by Nowak and May (1992). The Nash equilibrium is the traditional solu-
tion concept in game theory. It depends on the cognitive abilities of the players (Nowak, 
Sigmund 2004; Requejo, Camacho 2011).
In the theory of evolutionary game the different pattern of behaviour of the agents of a 
game are considered and the behaviour which has the potential to overrule other forms of 
behaviour in the long run is studied.
The long term behaviour of evolutionary game is studied through its replicator dynamics 
as follows:
 
( ) ( )i i i
dx
x f x x
dt
= −ϕ   , 
1




x x f x
=
ϕ =∑ , (2)
where ix  is the proportion of type ith behaviour in the population, and the distribution of n 
types are represented as the vector 1 2( , ,..., )nx x x x= . Also ( )if x  and ( )xϕ  are the fitness of 
type i  the average population fitness respectively. As ix are proportions and vector x  sum 
to unity the equation is defined on the n -dimensional simplex. The replicator equation as-
sumes a uniform population distribution. If A  be the payoff matrix of the evolutionary game 
Eq. (2) can be written as:
 
( )i Ti i
dx
x Ax x Ax
dt
 = −  , (3)
where ( )iAx  is the expected payoff and Tx Ax  be the mean fitness of the whole population. 
The state of the evolutionary game is specified by the fractions of each population currently 
employing. The state of the population in any time t is represented by a probability p of cur-
rently using the first mode, and 1 p−  of using the second mode (Hilbe 2011; Rosas 2010).
Table 1. Linguistic variables to describe relative outcomes and the Fuzzy scale value
Linguistic variables to describe relative outcomes Likert Scale Fuzzy scale
Extremely High (EH) 9 (7, 9, 9)
Very Very high (VVH) 7 (5, 7, 9)
Very High (VH) 5 (3, 5, 7)
High (H) 3 (1, 3, 5)
Medium (ME) 1 (1, 1, 3)
Low (LO) –3 (–5, –3, –1)
Very Low (VL) –5 (–7, –5, –3)
Very Very Low (VVL) –7 (–9, –7, –5)
Extremely Low (EL) –9 (–9, –9, –7)
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Table 2. Pay-off matrix
Strategy of Tea 
Industry
Strategy of Government/Indian Tea Board
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
W1 1Tπ 2Tπ 3Tπ 4Tπ 5Tπ
W2 6Tπ 7Tπ 8Tπ 9Tπ 10Tπ
W3 11Tπ 12Tπ 13Tπ 14Tπ 15Tπ
W4 16Tπ 17Tπ 18Tπ 19Tπ 20Tπ
4. Representing MCDM as an evolutionary game
The input payoff matrix of the evolutionary game perspective of tea production decision 
making problem, the tea industries strategies for development i.e. component ( )i ix x X∈  
are changing with time. Let M be the pay-off matrix representing the expected outcome of 
the MCDM problem. Let ix  and jy  be the probabilities of i th strategy of the TEO and j th 
strategy of tea board respectively. Then the replicator dynamics of the corresponding evolu-
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= × ×∑∑ , Eq.  (4) refer to the 
payoff functions of a tea industry who embraces diverse strategies. If the industry selects the 
development strategy with praiseworthy CSR performance, then its payoff functions are 1Tπ , 
2Tπ , 3Tπ , 4Tπ , 5Tπ ; therefore the strategic development wise payoff matrix can be shown 
as Table 2.
In recent year few research works are published on uncertain game problem. Deng et al. 
(2016) and Deng et al. (2017) focused on the solution of games with Payoffs of Dempster-
Shafer belief structures. Here in this problem the evolutionary dynamics is considered with 
stochastic payoff and imprecise (fuzzy) initial condition. Also the initial weightage of strate-
gies at any circumstances is not precisely known on the basis of incomplete knowledge. This 
is modelled as triangular fuzzy numbers depending upon the expert opinion on current 
status of ITI.
Hence the decision problem in ITI could be modelled as Eqs. (4)–(5).
Here, the input payoff matrix M  is taken with 10% standard error with at least 95% 
of confidence level. i.e. ( )ijtA I W M= + σ , where 310σ =  and 
ij
tW  denotes independent 
Wiener processes with ( ) 0ijtE W =  and ( ) ( ) ( )2 2ij ij ijt t tVar W E W E W t = − = 
 
.
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The replicator dynamics for the corresponding evolutionary game is solved numerically 
to obtain stable fixed points which are also evolutionary stable and mixed stable strategies 
or Nash equilibrium of the game. The stability of those fixed points are verified through lo-
cal stability analysis and validated by the linier profile of the plots of evolution of strategies 
along with time.
For the sake of Monte Carlo simulation we have considered 1000 random iteration and 
the ensemble of the solution is obtained. Result obtained by MATLAB shows that there is no 
significant difference between mean and median as the ensemble with the linguistic payoff 
converted by nine point Likert scale (Table 1).
5. Result and discussion
5.1. Representing MCDM as evolutionary game in deterministic form
In the proposed simulation model, the tea management of industries has four strategies while 
the ITB has five strategies which leads to a 4×5 payoff matrix in linguistic scale (Table 3) 
constructed from four groups of industries for each of four scenarios. Thus, sixteen differ-
ent clusters of simulation testing are performed, each cluster for nine strategies, as shown in 
separate parts for tea owners and tea board (Figures 2–13). In this four figures the evolution 
of strategies 1W , 2W , 3W  and 4W  are shown by green, red, deep blue and black curves re-
spectively, whereas the evolution of strategies 1R , 2R , 3R , 4R  and 5R  are denoted by green, 
red, deep blue, black, cyan curves respectively.
(a) Here the deterministic system indicates there is no market volatility and no impreci-
sion in terms of pay-off irrespective of balanced management of tea industry. The results 
depicted in Table 4, show that 2W  (for tea industry) and 1R  (ITB strategy) are ESS hence 
the Nash equilibrium of the MCDM problem under 1S  and 1G  (Figure 2a). In the same way, 
other groups also find their ESS. For 2G , 1W  is ESS for tea owner and mixed ESS for tea 
board with probability of 1R  and 2R  are 0.9987 and 0.13 respectively (Figure 2b). In case 
of 3G , tea owner as well as ITB are in a volatile position for their strategies implementation 
with 1W , 2W  and 1R , 3R , 4R (Figure 2c). And for 4G ; 2W  and 1R  are found to be ESS 
(Figure 2d).
(b) In case of 2S  (Figure 3), for this system the 2W  and 5R  converge to the ESS (1, 1) 
for 1G  tea industries who implement the 2W  strategic development with 5R  ITBs strategy 
and make balance management with CSR (3a). Similarly, 2W  and 5R  for 2G , 1W  and 4R  
for 3G  converges to ESS (3b, 3c). Finally, for 4G , the system finds mixed strategy as 1W , 2W  
for tea owner and 1R , 4R  for ITB. All the strategies are used for CSR activity (3d).
(c) For 3S  (Figure 4), the 1W  and 1R  converge to the ESS (1, 1) for the 1G  tea industries 
(4a). In the same way, other groups also find their suitable strategies. However, the other 
strategies ( 2W , 3W , 4W , 2R , 3R , 4R , 5R ) for 1G , reflect different convergence tendencies with 
initial settings for scenario 4(a) and drops to ESS (0, 0). For 2G , 3W  is a stable strategy of 
industry and thus ITBs playing strategy 5R  (4b). In case of 3G , tea owners are in a volatile 
position for their strategies implementation with 2W , 3W , 4W  and ITB with 1R  (4c). And 
for 4G , stability may persist with 1W  for tea owner while, ITB is stacked to 5R  (4d).
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Table 3. Pay-off matrix under S1 – G1
Probability
1( )P R 2( )P R 3( )P R 4( )P R 5( )P R
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
1( )P W W1 VVH ME H ME H
2( )P W W2 VVH ME H ME ME
3( )P W W3 VH ME LO LO LO
4( )P W W4 H ME VL LO VL
Table 4. The deterministic pay-off value
Tea industry Government/ Indian Tea Board
W1 W2 W3 W4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
2(a) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2(b) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9987 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2(c) 0.7418 0.2582 0.0000 0.0000 0.8216 0.0000 0.1568 0.0216 0.0000
2(d) 0.0012 0.9916 0.0057 0.0015 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3(a) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
3(b) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
3(c) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
3(d) 0.0144 0.9856 0.0000 0.0000 0.5231 0.0000 0.0000 0.4769 0.0000
4(a) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4(b) 0.0002 0.0000 0.9998 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
4(c) 0.0000 0.3977 0.5939 0.0084 0.9971 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0029
4(d) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
5(a) 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5(b) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
5(c) 0.6672 0.0004 0.0000 0.3324 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5(d) 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000
(d) In the 4S  (Figure 5), 1W  and 1R  converge to the ESS (1, 1) for the 1G  (5a). For 2G , 
tea industry has strong probability to choose 2W  while ITB to emphasize on 4R  for CSR 
based strategic development (5b). In case of 3G , tea owner chooses mixed strategy with 1W  
and 4W  while, ITB is stick to implement strategy 1R  (5c). And for 4G , ESS is found with 
2W  for tea owner while, 4R  is for ITB strategy.
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Figure 2. The crisp evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under 1S  
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5.2. Representing MCDM as evolutionary game in imprecise nature
(a) In this case the fuzzy variables are represented as the imprecise effect of different strate-
gies under pay-off matrix for the balance management of tea industry. From the above analy-
sis it is observed that for 1S , 2G  the most favourable strategies are 1W , 2W  and 3W  with 
probabilities [0.2755, 0.2784], [0.2755, 0.2784] and [0.4132, 0.4176] respectively for the tea 
industry management and 1R , 2R , 3R  and 4R  with probabilities [0.4132, 0.4176], [0.1377, 
0.1392], [0.1377, 0.1392] and [0.2755, 0.2784] respectively as shown in Table 6 and Figure 6 
(6b). Similarly, same strategies are favourable for 1G  (6a), 3G  (6c) and 4G  (6d).
(b) For 2S , both 1G  and 2G  shows the deterministic strategy i.e. 4W  and 5R  for estate 
owner and tea board (7a, 7b). While for 3G  under same scenario, it is observed that all four 
strategies ( 1W , 2W , 3W  and 4W ) of owner of the tea garden are favourable with probabilities 
[0.3306, 0.3332], [0.3306, 0.3332], [0.2204, 0.2221] and [0.1114, 0.1175] respectively, the ITB 
have 1R , 2R , 3R  and 4R  with probabilities [0.441, 0.444], [0.2204, 0.2221], [0.2204, 0.2221] 
and [0.1102, 0.1111] respectively represented in 7c of Figure 7.
(c) The imprecision in effect of different strategies in terms of balance management of 
tea industry both owner and ITB performs strategies 4W  and 5R  like the cases as in deter-
ministic nature under 3S  for all groups (Figure 8).
(d) For 4S , it is seen that 3G  have most favourable strategies as 1W , 2W  and 3W with 
probabilities [0.3692, 0.3709], [0.3692, 0.3709] and [0.2462, 0.2473] respectively and 1R , 2R , 
3R  and 4R  with probabilities [0.369, 0.371], [0.1231, 0.1236], [0.2462, 0.2473] and [0.2463, 
0.2473] respectively as shown in Figure 9c. Similarly, same strategies are favourable for 1G  
(9a), 2G  (9b) and 4G  (9d).
Figure 4. The crisp evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under 3S
4a) 4b)
4c) 4d)
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Figure 5. The crisp evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S4
Table 5. Evolutionary probability of different strategies with imprecise impact of strategy interaction 
under S1 – G2 for different α-cut
α-value W1 W2 W3 W4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
0
Lower 0.2755 0.2755 0.4132 0.0257 0.4132 0.1377 0.1377 0.2755 0.026
Upper 0.2784 0.2784 0.4176 0.0351 0.4176 0.1392 0.1392 0.2784 0.035
0.2
Lower 0.2757 0.2757 0.4135 0.0269 0.4135 0.1378 0.1378 0.2757 0.027
Upper 0.278 0.278 0.417 0.0344 0.417 0.139 0.139 0.278 0.034
0.4
Lower 0.2759 0.2759 0.4138 0.0282 0.4138 0.1379 0.1379 0.2759 0.028
Upper 0.2776 0.2776 0.4165 0.0338 0.4165 0.1388 0.1388 0.2776 0.034
0.6
Lower 0.2761 0.2761 0.4141 0.0297 0.4141 0.138 0.138 0.2761 0.03
Upper 0.2772 0.2772 0.4158 0.0331 0.4158 0.1386 0.1386 0.2772 0.033
0.8
Lower 0.2763 0.2763 0.4144 0.0313 0.4144 0.1381 0.1381 0.2763 0.031
Upper 0.2768 0.2768 0.4152 0.0325 0.4152 0.1384 0.1384 0.2768 0.033
1
Lower 0.2764 0.2764 0.4146 0.0325 0.4146 0.1382 0.1382 0.2764 0.033
Upper 0.2764 0.2764 0.4146 0.0325 0.4146 0.1382 0.1382 0.2764 0.033
5a)    5b)
5c)    5d)
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Figure 6. The imprecise evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S1
6a)    6b)
6c)    6d)
Figure 7. The imprecise evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S2
7a)    7b)
7c)    7d)
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Figure 8. The imprecise evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S3
Figure 9. The imprecise evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S4
8a)    8b)
8c)    8d)
9a)    9b)
9c)    9d)
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5.3. Representing MCDM as evolutionary game in fuzzy stochastic nature
(a) The fuzzy stochastic model considers the scenario where there is imprecision on the im-
pact of different strategies as well as market volatility. In this case it is observed that for 1S , 
the 4G  have the most favourable strategies as 1W , 2W  and 3W  with probabilities [0.0917, 
0.1674], [0.1959, 0.3639] and [0.3118, 0.5518] respectively for the tea industry management 
and 1R , 2R , 3R  and 4R with probabilities [0.2011, 0.3722], [0.0867, 0.1657], [0.0805, 0.2341] 
and [0.2013, 0.3097] respectively as shown in Table 7, Figure 10d. Similarly, same strategies 
are favourable for 1G  (10a), 2G  (10b) and 2W  (10c).
(b) Here, the fuzzy stochastic model considers the scenario where there is imprecision 
on the impact of different strategies as well as market volatility. From the above analysis it is 
observed that for 4G , 3G  the most favourable strategies are 1G , 2G , 3W  and 4W  with prob-
abilities [0.2035, 0.3271], [0.2065, 0.3619], [0.1325, 0.2484] and [0.0547, 0.123] respectively 
for the tea industry management and 1R , 2R , 4R  and 1R  with probabilities [0.3049, 0.4921], 
[0.1094, 0.2318], [0.1299, 0.2418] and [0.0631, 0.1307] respectively as shown in Figure 11c.
(c) In 3S , the fuzzy stochastic model in effect of different strategies and market volatility 
for balance management of tea industry, both owner and ITB performs strategies 4W  and 
5R  as like deterministic in nature for every scenarios and groups as in Figure 12. 
(d) For this model it is observed that for 4S , the 4G  have the most favourable strategies 
are 1R , 2W  and 3W  with probabilities [0.0897, 0.2061], [0.2102, 0.392] and [0.337, 0.4938] 
respectively for the tea industry management and 2G , 4G , 1R  and 3R  with probabilities 
[0.1942, 0.4149], [0.0898, 0.2267], [0.0841, 0.1722] and [0.1829, 0.3403] respectively as shown 
in Table 7, Figure 13d.
Figure 10. The fuzzy stochastic evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S1
10a)    10b)
10c)    10d)
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Table 6. Evolutionary probability of different strategies with imprecise impact of strategy interaction 
and market volatility under S1 – G2 for different α-cut
α-value W1 W2 W3 W4 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
0
Lower 0.0897 0.2102 0.3370 0.0003 0.1942 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.2061 0.3920 0.4938 0.0285 0.4149 0.2267 0.1722 0.3403 0.0288
0.2
Lower 0.0897 0.2102 0.3370 0.0003 0.2068 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.2196 0.3843 0.5593 0.0199 0.3965 0.1830 0.1740 0.3551 0.0173
0.4
Lower 0.0897 0.2126 0.3370 0.0003 0.2068 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.2345 0.3812 0.5301 0.0187 0.3765 0.1477 0.1799 0.3378 0.0238
0.6
Lower 0.0897 0.2126 0.3370 0.0003 0.2068 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.1844 0.3408 0.5567 0.0402 0.3557 0.2364 0.1763 0.3626 0.0278
0.8
Lower 0.0897 0.2126 0.3370 0.0003 0.2068 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.1770 0.3514 0.5366 0.0338 0.4308 0.1808 0.1963 0.3766 0.0229
1
Lower 0.0897 0.2126 0.3370 0.0003 0.2068 0.0898 0.0841 0.1829 0.0003
Upper 0.1659 0.3993 0.5383 0.0223 0.3565 0.1978 0.2019 0.3632 0.0191
Figure 11. The fuzzy stochastic evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S2
11a)    11b)
11c)    11d)
170 A. Debnath et al. Game theory based multi criteria decision making problem under uncertainty...
Figure 12. The fuzzy stochastic evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S3
Figure 13. The fuzzy stochastic evolutionary process for 1 2 3 4, , ,G G G G  under S4
12a)    12b)
12c)    12d)
13a)    13b)
13c)    13d)
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5.4. Major implications
For tea producer, the best alternative strategies are found (Table 7) to be “Development with 
Pledge” CSR ( 2W ) in deterministic circumstances, whereas under imprecision of impact of 
strategy interaction (payoff) the best alternatives are “Development with Pledge CSR” ( 2W ), 
“Development with Praiseworthy CSR” ( 1W ) and “Development with Scattering CSR” ( 3W ) 
respectively. Moreover, when imprecise impact of strategy interaction is considered along 
with market volatility “Development with Praiseworthy CSR” ( 1W ) and “Development with 
Pledge CSR” ( 2W ) dominates other strategies for TEO.
For tea board the best alternative strategies are found to be “Increase of Substantive national 
and international Tea demand” ( 2G ) in deterministic circumstances, whereas under impreci-
sion of impact of strategy interaction (payoff) the best alternatives are “Increase of Substantive 
national and international Tea demand” ( 1R ), “Comprehensive Infrastructure of Tea Industry” 
( 2R ), and “Inclusive Labour Policy” ( 3R ) respectively. However, under the consideration of 
imprecise impact of strategy interaction and with market volatility “Increase of Substantive 
national and international Tea demand” ( 1R ), “Comprehensive Infrastructure of Tea Industry” 
( 2R ), and “Inclusive Labour Policy” ( 3R ) respectively. Similarly, for other groups ( 2G , 3G  and 
4G ) under different scenarios ( 2S , 3S  and 4S ) the preferential order of different strategies 
is shown in the Table 7. The effect of imprecise payoffs (uncertainty in outcome of the pair 
of strategies ( ( , )i jW R , 1,2,3,4; 1,2,3,4,5.i j= = ), as well as market volatility is also reported.
It could be concluded from Table 7 that “Development with Pledge CSR ( 2W )” and “De-
velopment with Praiseworthy CSR ( 1W )” are favourable strategies for almost all groups of 
tea producers whereas in uncertain environment “Development with Scattering CSR ( 3W )” 
could have yield better result for group 2 and group 4 under scenario 1. Furthermore, in 
this case the tea board should employ strategy “Safeguard of Satisfactory National and In-
ternational Tea Demand ( 1R )” with an invasion of “Wide-ranging assistance to ITE ( 4R )” 
in uncertain circumstances. In case of scenario 2, “Pledge CSR” is the best alternative for all 
groups except the third one, which should adopt strategy “Praiseworthy CSR”. On the con-
trary of the previous case in uncertain circumstances “Development with Fatigue CSR ( 4W )” 
is most ideal option for group 1 and group 2; whereas “Pledge CSR” and ‘Praiseworthy CSR” 
are most suitable strategies for scenario 3, but “Scattering CSR” is the best alternative for 
group 4. Under this scenario, “Ample Morality development ( 5R )” is the better alternative for 
group 1 and group 2 though in deterministic condition satisfactory demand will yield better 
result for group 2. However, “Satisfactory demand and Inclusive Labour Policy ( 3R )” would 
serve better for group 3 and group 4 though in deterministic case “Wide-ranging assistance” 
and “Satisfactory demand” are better strategies for group 3 and group 4 respectively. For sce-
nario 3, “praiseworthy CSR” is the best strategy for group 1 and group 4 “whereas scattering 
CSR” serves better for group 2 and group 3 in deterministic case. However, in uncertainty 
‘fatigue CSR” is the best strategy for all the groups. Wherein if tea board adopts “satisfactory 
demand” it will serve better for group 1 and group 3 but employing Morality development 
will boost group 2 and group 4. Herein, “morality development” serves as best option for all 
the groups in uncertain environment just like “wide-ranging assistance” serves for the ITEs. 
Finally, in the last scenario “Praiseworthy CSR” is the best alternative for group 1 and group 3 
and “Pledge CSR” will boost them in uncertain environment. Similarly, “Pledge CSR” is the 
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best alternative for group 2 and group 4 and “scattering CSR” will boost them in uncertain 
circumstances. Moreover, if tea board employ “satisfactory demand” it will help group 1 and 
group 3 to grow but adoption of “wide-ranging assistance “will help group 2 and group 4. 
However, in uncertain case “satisfactory demand” seems to be the best strategy for all the 
groups though “Inclusive Labour Policy” also serves better for group 1 and group 3 whereas 
“wide-ranging assistance” serves better for group 2 and group 4.
From the above simulation outcomes, the following most important suggestions could 
be summarized as:
(1) The ITI and ITB can work jointly to advance the CSR performance in downstream 
(those are in group 2 and group 3) tea industries. In multiple-scenarios as regulatory 
strategy it can be observed that they may affect each other’s behaviour. As a result, this 
can alter the professional strategies of ITI and ITB for the whole market. In practice, 
a large number of tea industries have accepted policies to face CSR matters for them-
selves, for example Bagrakota, Dunkun etc.
(2) CSR proficiency is a crucial issue for the collaboration affinity among multiple-scenar-
ios for regulatory purpose in the long term of entrepreneurship. In veracity, this will 
encourage the development of skills and willingness and implement CSR to workers 
specifically the Makaibari and Glen burn Tea Company etc. 
(3) Results presented in section 5.4 and Table 7 affirm the final selection of strategies of 
ITI and ITB based on the “unmoved” and “altered” scenarios.
Conclusions
The sustainability of an economic development model depends on the long term effects of the 
adopted strategies. As a consequence, a multi-agent decision problem could naturally modelled 
as an evolutionary game problem. The major concern is to determine the effective decisions 
(development plans) that could generate better goal (profit) than the others in the long run. In 
this paper the multi-agent decision problem in ITI is modelled as evolutionary game and the 
corresponding replicator dynamics is solved to find evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) and 
evolutionary mixed strategies (EMS). These ESS and EMS are indeed Nash equilibriums of the 
multi-agent decision problem, which are the set of decisions such that no agent has any benefit 
by switching his decision in the long run. In the context of multi-agent decision problem these 
ESSs and EMSs are the sustainable decisions where no agent has any benefit by deviating from it.
Hence this methodology is applicable with any multi-agent decision making problem 
where more than one agent makes their decision simultaneously and the outcome depends 
upon the decision of all the agents. However single agent decision problem comes under the 
class of control problems. Therefore the sustainable evolutionary solutions for any multi-
agent decision making problem could be obtained by the novel evolutionary game theory 
based model proposed in this paper. 
The evolutionary game dynamics identifies the strategic behaviours which could be sus-
tained in the long run i.e. the strategies which would could wipe out the other strategies 
evolutionarily. So this approach could assess the impact of different strategic regulations and 
could identify those which could results better productivity in the long run as sustainable 
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strategies. However the short term impact of strategies may not be properly depicted in this 
approach. This is the sole limitation of the method.  
Moreover, the outcomes of decision strategies are considered to be imprecise in this study 
whereas the volatility of the market is modelled as stochastic white noise. Hence forth best al-
ternative (sustainable) decision strategies in uncertain circumstances are obtained for multi-
group and multi-scenarios decision problem in ITI. The uncertainty on in the outcomes of 
decisions are considered to be imprecise and modelled as fuzzy evolutionary game based 
on multi-agent decision making problem. Also fuzzy stochastic evolutionary game model is 
developed to incorporate the random effect of market volatility. In each cases the replicator 
dynamics is solved to obtain sustainable strategies and the effect of uncertainties are analysed 
with the template deterministic system. Further, the simulation results overall matches the 
CSR activities of different group of tea industries in India which validates our results. The 
analysis indicates that different group of tea industries can form distinguished pattern of 
sustainable development with CSR activities under uncertainty. 
This study can help tea industries and tea board to propagate effective policies in the long 
run. The present work could be extended by exploring, such as effect of local community 
participation as another agent or by considering more socio political constraints. Also the 
methodology could be applied to some other multi-agent decision making problems with 
different objectives of the agents in general which could be modelled as multi criteria multi-
agent decision making problems.
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